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1. Introduction 
One of the prominent characteristics of the Chinese stock market is the segmentation between 
the domestic investors and foreign investors. Prior to 2001, China was the only country with 
total restrictions on foreign participation in the domestic equity market. A-shares listed on the 
Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges could only be traded by domestic investors.  
The only opportunity for foreign participation in the Chinese equity markets was through 
companies that issued a separate, restricted class of shares for foreigners. In Shanghai or 
Shenzhen foreign investors could trade and own B-shares. These separate classes of shares 
are legally identical, with the same voting rights and dividends. The only difference between 
these classes was the investors who could own them. (For historical development of the 
Chinese stock markets, see Ma (2004)).   
In February 2001, as the first step toward opening the domestic market to foreigners, the 
Chinese authorities announced that the domestic investors would be allowed to invest in the 
B-market using foreign currency accounts. In November 2002, the Chinese authorities made 
a further step to open the domestic market to foreign investors. Some selected foreign 
institutions were allowed to invest in A-shares through the so-called QFII (Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors) provision by the Chinese securities regulatory authority. Hence, 
overtime there has been a significant reduction in the degree of segmentation across these two 
markets. 
One of the recent interests in finance literature is the information asymmetry between 
local and distant investors. Brennan and Cao (1997), Choe et al. (2005), and Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2000) argue that domestic investors are usually better informed because they have 
a linguistic and cultural advantage over the foreign investors regarding their local market. A 
well-known phenomenon of “home bias” can be explained by the information asymmetry 
across local and foreign investors in international equity markets.  The segmentation of local 
and foreign investors in the Chinese market therefore provides an opportunity to examine 
differences in the behaviour of these two investor groups. The impact of reductions in the 
level of segmentation between these investor groups are also used to understand how they 
interact. 
A number of studies argue that there are significant differences in the ease of access to 
the fundamental information between foreign and domestic investors and between retail and 
institutional investors in the Chinese market. Chakravarty et al. (1998) argue that due to 
language barriers, different accounting standards, and lack of reliable information about the 
local economy and firms, it is more difficult for foreign investors to acquire and assess 
information about local Chinese firms.  Chan et al. (2008) analyse trade and quote data of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from January 
2000 to November 2001. Using several measures of information asymmetry including the 
price impact coefficient, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, and the 
probability of informed trading (PIN), they find that information asymmetry explains the 
cross-sectional variation in foreign share discounts. The fact that the information asymmetry 
measurements are larger in the A-share market suggests that the domestic investors have an 
informational advantage relative to foreign investors. Further, the trades and quote revisions 
in the A-share market contain more information than those in the B-market. Thus, the 
discount of B-shares is largely due to the information asymmetry, as foreign investors are not 
as well informed as domestic investors.  
Brennan and Cao (1997) imply that the investors make their investment based on their 
private pre-disclosure information as well as historical public information. When a public 
announcement conveys good or bad news about the firm’s fundamentals, investors revise 
their prior beliefs and predicted payoff. The earnings announcements convey the most 
important fundamental news about the company. When new information about the earnings is 
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announced, the revision of investors to their prior beliefs and expected payoff causes a 
change in market price. The investors with more pre-disclosure information revise their belief 
less than the investors who have less pre-disclosure information. To examine this, we place 
our focus on market reactions in both A- and B-shares of China around earnings 
announcements. If A-share investors have an information advantage over their B-market 
counterparts as the previous studies suggest, the price revision upon earnings announcements 
would be lower. When the market became less segmented after 2002 however, as the level of 
information asymmetry was reduced between the A- and the B-market, the differences in the 
price revision to the news should be reduced too.  
While the announcement of news will cause a change in prices it also causes a change in 
the trading volume. Beaver (1968) argues that price changes upon the earnings announcement 
reflects an average change in investors’ beliefs, and trading volume arises because of 
differential belief revisions. In particular, trading volume reactions reflect a lack of consensus 
regarding the appropriate price of the firm’s share and it captures changes in the expectation 
of individual investors while price reactions reflect changes in the expectations of the market 
as a whole.  
In this study we hypothesise that both price adjustments and volume reactions around 
earnings announcements will differ across the A- and B-markets. Both the domestic investors 
in A-markets and the foreign investors in B-markets revise their expectations and 
interpretation about the earnings of the company based on their own pre-disclosure belief. In 
particular, the market with more pre-disclosure information, the A-market, should experience 
a lower adjustment in prices compared to the B-market. This difference is expected to get 
smaller as the two markets become integrated.  Additionally, the A-market was initially 
dominated by individual investors and the B-market was traditionally dominated by foreign 
institutional investors. Chakravarty et al. (1998) argue that apart from the official resources 
for information which are available to both local and foreign investors, the local investors 
may also take advantage of other informal local information sources that are unavailable to 
foreigners. Thus the local investors are exposed to a more diverse pre-disclosure information 
pool and thus have more diverse expectations and interpretations of the upcoming news. If 
this is the case, we expect to see more reaction in trading volume associated with a price 
change in A-market. In comparison, foreign institutional investors in the B-market have less 
divergent expectations and interpretations about the upcoming news, and therefore it should 
not take much trading activity to induce a price change in the B-market.  
We use stocks with both A- and B-shares to examine changes in returns and trading 
volumes around earnings announcements. We examine the differences in the magnitude of 
the changes in returns and volumes of A- and B-shares to assess which market reacts more. 
We consider the period before February 2001 when the markets were completely segmented 
as well as the period after 2002 when the trading restrictions of the two markets were 
reduced. This allows us to investigate whether local and foreign investors react differently to 
the same earnings announcements during a period of complete segmentation and after the 
regulatory change when the markets are more integrated.  
Our findings suggest that there are significant price changes in both of the markets 
following the announcements. When the two markets were segmented the price reaction in 
the A-market was significantly smaller than the B-market. However, when trade restrictions 
across the two markets were reduced in 2002, the differences in price reactions declined and 
became insignificant. We also find that there was a significant increase in trading volume 
around or on the announcement day in A-markets prior to 2001 and in B-markets after 2002.  
The results indicate that local A-market investors possess more diverse expectations and 
interpretations about the announcements while foreign B-market investors possess less 
divergent expectations and interpretations when the two markets are segmented. However, 
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the investor disagreement has increased in B-markets and decreased in A-markets when the 
two markets are integrated.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents previous literature, and 
section 3 details institutional features of the Chinese market. Section 4 introduces the data 
and section 5 presents the method employed. The results are reported in section 6 and section 
7 concludes. 
2. Previous literature 
A large number of previous studies have examined differences in the pricing of A- and B-
shares in China. Many of these studies examine periods during which the A- and B- share 
markets were segmented into local and foreign investors, respectively.2 These studies have 
consistently shown that when the markets were segmented the B-shares traded at a significant 
discount to the A shares.3 The differences in pricing in the A- and B- markets have been 
explained by a range of factors including information asymmetry, liquidity effects, 
diversification effects and differential risk premiums.  
The existing literature reveals that the earnings information is value relevant in the 
Chinese market. Su (2003) is one of a few studies to examine the Chinese stock price 
reactions to changes in earnings per share (EPS). Using a small sample of stocks from 1997 
to 1998, he finds that domestic A-share investors do not anticipate the EPS changes and 
slowly adjust to the new earnings information. However, the international investors in the B-
share market predict changes in EPS better and there is little or no abnormal announcement-
day effects. Thus, he claims that Chinese A-share markets are speculative while B-share 
markets are relatively more efficient. Huang (2004) investigates the Chinese stock price 
reactions to financial announcements in 2002. Contrary to Su’s findings, Huang reports that 
both A-share and B-share stocks respond to the financial announcements. Moreover, B-share 
prices react more strongly to negative financial announcements than A-shares.  
Both of these studies have found that earnings announcements are informationally 
valuable to investors. However, their findings on the information efficiency of the A- versus 
the B-market are contradictory. Neither of these studies examined the changes in trading 
volume. Some accounting literature has suggested that trading volume and returns capture 
fundamentally different aspects of the market’s assimilation of information (Bamber 1986, 
1987). Beaver (1968) argues that abnormal trading volume reflects the degree to which 
individual investors revise their expectations in response to earnings announcements while 
abnormal returns reflect the aggregate or average revision in expectations. Thus volume 
reaction may be a more sensitive test of the usefulness of a public disclosure than price 
reactions. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) agree that price changes reflect the change in the 
market’s average belief, while trading volume preserves differences among individual 
investors’ beliefs that are “cancelled out” in the averaging process that determines the price. 
Thus price changes and volume changes reveal different perspectives on the “market 
reaction”. To better understand the market responses to earnings announcements in the 
Chinese market, it is important to examine both the change in trading volume of stocks and 
the price adjustments.  
Gao and Tse (2004) examined about 112 annual earnings announcements on sixty stocks 
covered by IBES prior to 2000. They argue that the investors in the B-share market react to 
both the IAS (International Accounting Standards) and PRC GAAP (People’s Republic of 
                                                 
2 Chan et al. (2007) provides a review of recent studies of the Chinese financial markets. 
3 See for example Chakravarty et al. (1998), Sun and Tong (2000). Bergstrom and Tang (2001), Fung et al. 
(2000), Fung and Leung (2002), Xu and Fung (2002), Yang (2003), Mei et al. (2004) and Wang et al. (2005). 
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China Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) earnings announcements, while the A-
share investors react only to PRC GAAP earnings reports. They also find that the abnormal 
trading volumes in the A-share market persist for a longer period than those in the B-share 
market.  
The eventual goal for the Chinese government is to establish an integrated market. A 
series of regulatory changes since 2001 have reduced the trading restrictions between the A 
and B-markets. More recently, a number of studies have considered changes in the pricing 
differentials between the markets following the regulatory change in 2001 and 2002. These 
studies indicate that the price differentials between A and B shares were reduced following 
the reduction in market segmentation (Karolyi & Li 2003). If the regulatory change has 
achieved its goal as other studies suggest, the integration of the markets would have reduced 
or eliminated the information asymmetry across A- and B-markets. Thus by examining 
investors’ responses in both markets before and after the regulatory change, our study is able 
to reveal whether the policy change has improved the assimilation of pre-disclosure 
information in both A and B-markets.  
3. Institutional features of Chinese stock market 
The Chinese market consists of two stock exchanges: the SHSE and the SZSE. Both 
exchanges were established in the early 1990s. By the end of 2004, SHSE had 837 listed 
companies with total market capitalisation of 2,601.43 billion Yuan, and SZSE had 536 listed 
companies with total market capitalisation of 1,104.12 billion Yuan (SHSE, SZSE Fact 
Books 2004). Both exchanges utilize a fully electronic order driven trading system and 
trading rules are essentially the same across the two markets. Most companies listed on the 
SHSE are large and mainly state-owned, while the companies on SZSE are relatively smaller, 
with most of these being joint ventures and export companies (Xu 2000). Cross-listing 
between these two stock exchanges is not allowed. 
A Chinese company can issue five types of shares in the domestic markets. These are 
state shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-shares, and B-shares. Only A- and B-
shares are tradable shares.4 A-shares are issued to domestic investors while B-shares are 
issued to foreign investors. B-shares are special Renminbi-denominated ordinary shares but 
are traded in foreign currency. B-shares are quoted in US dollars on SHSE, and HK dollars 
on SZSE.  
Chinese listed companies announce their earnings and other financial information 
through four periodic reports. The annual report must be released within four months of the 
end of each financial year, the half-year report must be published within two months of the 
end of half-year, and the quarterly reports must be published within one month of the end of 
each quarter.5 Listed companies are required to publish their periodic reports on the 
nominated websites by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the extract 
or the full reports must be published in at least one nominated newspaper.6  
Companies with both A- and B-shares need to prepare two sets of financial statements: 
one is based on the International Accounting Standard (IAS) for the B-share holders and the 
other is based on the domestic accounting standard, PRC GAAP, for the A-share holders. 
Both sets of financial statements are released on the same day. Both A- and B-share holders 
                                                 
4 From April 2005, the Chinese government and SFC (Securities and Futures Commission) officially started the 
reform on the untradeable shares. To be able to gain trading rights, the shareholders of untradeable shares would 
compensate the shareholders of tradable shares for the negative market impact.   
5 The annual report is to be released no later than 30 April, the half-year report is to be released no later than 31 
August and the quarterly reports are to be released within one month after each end of quarter. 
6 The report can also be published in other sources, but no earlier than the time of the release by CSRC. 
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can access two sets of financial statements. B-shares are usually owned by institutional 
investors and they also receive half-yearly earnings and dividend reports and an annual 
report. A-shares are usually owned by domestic individual investors, who are informed about 
company reports in the newspaper or via other media. Theoretically both domestic and 
foreign investors are able to access the same information at the same time. However, 
Chakarvarty, et al. (1998) argue that foreign investors have difficulty acquiring and accessing 
information about local Chinese firms due to language barriers as well as differences in 
accounting standards and unreliable information.   
4. Data  
We selected all Chinese companies with both A- and B-shares listed over the period from 
August 1995 to March 2005. There are 90 companies with both A- and B-shares: 45 
companies listed in SZSE and 45 in SHSE. These companies made a total of 2,422 
announcements over the sample period. Any pair of announcements within twenty days of 
each other were removed from the sample to ensure that we have independent 
announcements in the sample.7 This reduced the number of announcements in the sample to 
2,115. 
Daily stock prices, trading volumes, market value and book to market ratios and interest 
rates data are obtained from DataStream. The earnings announcement data are obtained from 
the CSMAR (Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research) database. Market indices used 
are the SHSE A- and B-share indices as well as SZSE A- and B-share indices, which are also 
obtained from DataStream.  
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the market movements of two stock exchange indices from 
August 1994 to August 2005. For the period prior to mid-2000, the A- and B- markets 
experienced different dynamics with considerable price differences between the two markets. 
In particular, B-shares were heavily discounted compared to the A-shares on both exchanges. 
However, subsequent to the regulatory change in 2001 and 2002 the two markets have 
become more correlated with each other and there is a convergence in A and B-market price 
movements starting in mid-2001.  
To incorporate the structural breaks of two markets due to the regulatory change, we 
split our sample into two sub-periods: the period before this change, from 1 August 1995 to 
20 February 2001, and the period after this change, from 1 February 2003 to 1 August 2005. 
We discard the transitional period between 20 February 2001 and 1 February 2003 to be able 
to better detect the effect of regulatory change.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample from each of the exchanges as at 1 
August 2005. There are 45 companies with both A- and B-shares in SHSE and SZSE 
respectively. These results show that the market value of A-shares in our sample is larger 
than B-shares for both exchanges.8 In SHSE, the P/E ratios and trading volumes of A-shares 
are also larger than the B-shares, which indicates that there is a price premium for A-shares 
or a price discount for B-shares. There is more trading activity in A-shares than B-shares. The 
level of trading in A-shares is more volatile than the B-market as shown by the difference in 
the standard deviation of trading volume in the two markets. However, in SZSE, there is no 
significant difference in P/E ratio and trading volume between A-shares and B-shares. Since 
stocks listed on two stock exchanges are subject to same trading rules and reporting 
requirements, we combined them for our analysis. 
                                                 
7 As we are only interested in the reactions from the earnings announcement, we exclude the observation if there 
are multiple announcements during the twenty-day window. 
8 This might be explained by the restrictions of foreign ownership. 
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5. Research design 
We adopted an event study approach to investigate how A- and B-share investors behave 
before and after the earnings announcements. Unlike previous studies, we controlled for firm-
specific characteristics by considering only those firms with both A- and B-shares. Therefore, 
the sample of firms included in each category is identical. The difference in behaviour across 
the A- and B- samples are not driven by firm-specific characteristics. It is well recognised in 
the finance literature that the stock market dynamics in positive and negative states are 
asymmetric. In particular, negative shocks to stock returns generate more volatility than a 
positive shock of equal magnitude (see Nelson 1991; Pagan & Schwert 1990; Campbell & 
Hentschel 1992; Engle & Ng 1993). We therefore separately analysed the market reactions to 
good and bad news. 
Ideally the earnings announcement study should be conducted using a measurement of 
earnings surprises. However, as the professional analyst market in China is in its infancy, 
there are no complete analyst forecast data available to enable us to calculate an earnings 
surprise.9 Therefore, we estimated the earnings surprise by examining the return from the 
previous day’s closing price. For both A and B markets, the sample was partitioned into two 
groups, positive and negative announcements. A positive earnings announcement is defined 
as an announcement that is associated with an increase in the stock price on the 
announcement day. A negative earnings announcement is associated with a decrease in the 
stock price on the announcement day.   
We used a 5-day window to measure returns and changes in trading volume before and 
after earnings announcements. The abnormal return over the event window was calculated as 
the difference of compound return and the expected return. The return was calculated as: 
, 1ln lnit it i tR P P    
where Pit is the closing price of stock i on day t and Rit is the actual compound return of stock 
i on day t. 
The abnormal return is calculated as: 
( )it it itAR R E R    
where ( )itE R is the expected return for stock i on day t. 
While all previous studies in the Chinese market have adopted a single index model to 
compute the expected returns during the event window, we estimated a Fama-French three 
factor model to adjust for the additional risk relating to the size, and the book-to-market ratio 
(Fama and French 1993).  We adopted this approach because the work of Eun and Huang 
(2007) and Wang and Di Iorio (2007) shows that both size and book-to-market effects are 
priced in the Chinese market while beta alone cannot fully measure the systematic risk. That 
is: 
( ) ( )it ft i mt ft i t i tE R R R R s SMB h HML    
   
where SMBt is the return difference of the portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large 
stocks and HMLt is the return difference of the portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and 
portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks. Rmt is the return of market index. Rft is the risk-free 
rate of return.10 , ,i i is h
 
are estimated from time series regression of each stock. 
                                                 
9 IBES has limited earnings forecast data on the Chinese stock market, however, as the forecast data are offered 
by the foreign institutional brokers, it is not clear how they are relevant to local investors.  
10 The risk-free rate for the A-share market is the China deposit rate and for the B-market is the US three-month 
Treasury bill rate.  
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Average abnormal returns AARt are calculated as the mean of the difference between the 
actual return and the expected returns across all announcements during the event window: 
,
1
1 N
t i t
i
AAR AR
N 
   
where N is the number of stocks on day t. 
Though the traditional t-test is only optimal when the abnormal returns are normally 
distributed, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) point out that it generally performs reasonably 
well with the daily return data. We adopted the cross-sectional test proposed by Pilotte (1992) 
to account for an increase in return variance during the announcement period.11 The 
traditional two sample t-statistics are employed to test the differences in returns and across A 
and B-markets. 
In addition to examining the reactions of price changes, we also investigated the market 
reactions in terms of changes in the trading volume. Previous research examined the level of 
trading volume during the event window. However, the normal t-statistics are not appropriate 
as the level of trading volume does not have a standard normal distribution: in fact it is highly 
skewed and leptokurtic. To avoid this problem, we employed the nonparametric median tests 
to examine the change in trading volume around the announcements.  
We computed the abnormal change in trading volume (AV) for each trading day within 
the event window where the abnormal change is calculated as follows:  
iit itAV Vol Vol   
where Volit is the percentage change of trading volume of stock i on day t. iVol  is the median 
percentage change of daily trading volume of stock i between -31 day to -11 day prior to the 
event window. The nonparametric median test for location was adopted to test the 
significance of the AVit. 
Average abnormal change in trading volumes for each trading day within the event 
window are: 
1
1 N
t it
i
AAV AV
N 
  . 
In addition to comparing the return and volume reactions of both A and B-markets we 
also adopted a regression to examine whether the reactions from good or bad news on the 
event day across two markets and different periods of time differ. The cross-sectional 
regression we run is: 
i m p n iAR a bD cD dD      , 
where ARi is the abnormal return on the event day for announcement i, and dummy Dm takes 
1 for A-market and 0 for B-market. Dp takes 1 for the period before 2001 when the two 
markets are completely segmented, and 0 for the period after 2002 when the two markets are 
integrated, dummy Dn takes 1 for negative news and 0 for positive news. 
                                                 
11 The t-statistic is calculated as follows: 
( ) / ,tt N AAR SD  and 
1/ 2
2
1
( ) /( 1) ,
N
t t
i
SD AR AAR N

    
 
 where ARt is the abnormal return and 
AARt is the mean cross-sectional abnormal return on day t of the event window. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Period with complete segmentation 
Table 2 depicts the return and volume reactions for negative announcements prior to 2001. 
There is a significant abnormal return (AR) of -3.1% in the A-market on the event day and -
5.1% in the B-market. There is a significant difference of 2% in ARs between the two 
markets. This result suggests that the A-market was on average more informed or less 
surprised by the announcements. 
When the trading volumes around the announcements were investigated, we found 
different levels of trading activity in the A- and B-markets. In the A-market, there was no 
abnormal activity on the day of the announcement, but there was a significant increase in 
activity on the day prior to and subsequent to the announcement day. Trading activity 
declined substantially two days after the announcement. It took three days for the trading to 
digest the news. However, in the B-market, there was no significant change in trading around 
the announcement. The significant price adjustment occurred in the absence of abnormal 
volume. A test of the difference in trading volume confirmed that the differences in trading 
around the announcement across the two markets were significant.  
These results indicated that the A-market experienced a significant increase in trading 
accompanied by a relative small price change, while the B-market experienced a larger price 
change without significant change in volume. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) claim that it is 
possible that earnings announcements generate different magnitudes of changes in trading 
volume and prices. When an earnings announcement generates differential belief revisions 
among investors, the trading volume is likely to be high relative to the price reaction. Bamber 
and Cheon (1995) further argue that there are significant conceptual differences between 
price and volume reactions to informative disclosures. If the investors have identical pre-
disclosure expectations and interpretations of the announcement, even if the announcement 
causes a change in average beliefs which induces a price change, the trading volume may be 
low. On the contrary, when an announcement generates differential belief revision, trading 
volume is likely to be high.  
The results of Table 2 suggest that in the case of negative announcements, the 
expectation and interpretation of A-market investors were more diverse and caused the 
volume to increase prior to the event. However, the diversity of investors’ expectations was 
not sufficient to move price significantly prior to the event, while on the event day the price 
adjusted significantly when investors became informed. In the B-market the investors had 
more similar expectations regarding the upcoming announcements, thus, there was no 
abnormal change in volume prior to the announcement. On the event day the price changed 
more dramatically when investors became informed. The price adjustment was larger in the 
B-market because the aggregate market was less informed and the adjustment needed to be 
bigger.   
Table 3 reports the result for positive announcements during this fully segmented period. 
On the event day, the significant abnormal return in the A-market was 2.5% while in the B-
market it was 3.5%. The difference in returns was about -1% across the two markets. 
Consistent with the results for negative news announcements, the results show that around 
positive announcements, the A-market was also less responsive than the B-market on the 
event day. Additionally, there was some information leakage in the B-market as the abnormal 
returns appeared to be significant five days before the announcement and one day before the 
announcement. The results here appear to show that it took longer for the B-market to adjust 
its price compared to the A-market, and that the adjustment was also larger in magnitude. 
The tests on trading volume show similar results to negative announcements. In the A-
market, there was a significant increase in trading on the event day and the day after the 
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announcement. There was a drop off in trading in the following days. Hence trading volume 
increased prior to negative news, but did not adjust ahead of positive news. Similar to the 
case of negative news, it also took longer in the A-market for the market to adjust to the 
positive news. This suggests that A-market investors anticipated the negative news earlier 
than the positive ones. Thus in the positive case, the abnormal trades occurred immediately 
upon the announcements when everyone was informed. In the B-market however, the 
reaction in volume is similar to the negative announcements, in which there generally was no 
significant increase or decrease in volume around the announcement. The results suggest that 
the B-market investors probably also had more similar expectations about positive news 
during the event window. On the event day, the price adjustment in the B-market was also 
larger as the overall market was less informed. 
Overall the results during this period indicate that the price adjustment in the A-market 
was less than the B-market for both positive and negative news. This is consistent with 
previous findings about information asymmetry across the two markets, which indicate that 
the B-market is less informed (Chan et al. 2008). However, our volume results also suggest 
that during this fully segmented period, the trading activity across the event window also 
differed in the two markets. In particular, it took longer in the A-market for the trading to be 
adjusted to a small price reaction, while in the B-market there was no significant change in 
trading, just a big price reaction instead.  
In the Chinese market, A-shares are mainly owned by individual investors while there 
are more institutional investors in the B-share market.12 The results in this period of time may 
have been due to the fact that domestic individual investors source and interpret the 
information more diversely, and thus it takes more trading to induce a relatively small price 
reaction compared to their B-counterparts. The main investors in the B-marketare foreign 
institutional investors who seem to predict and digest the upcoming news in a more 
unanimous way, and thus it does not take any trading to induce a larger price reaction. 
Additionally, there was no apparent difference in trading activity of the B-market regardless 
of the news type, whereas the A-market investors anticipated and traded more on negative 
news than positive news. Given the fact that short selling is not allowed in China, it appears 
local investors sell out of their positions when companies announce bad news.  
5.2. Period with reduced market segmentation 
Table 4 and Table 5 provide results for the period with reduced market segmentation. 
Table 4 summarizes the results for negative announcements. The abnormal return was -
1.8% in the A-market on the event day. For the B-market, the abnormal return on the event 
day was -1.9%. Compared to the pre 2001 period the price adjustments in both of the markets 
was smaller in magnitude, which suggests that the information content of the news was 
smaller. Contrary to the results prior to 2001, there is no significant difference in abnormal 
returns across the two markets on the event day. The results here suggest that although the 
price reactions in the A-market were still smaller than the B-market, the difference between 
the two markets declined and was no longer statistically significant.  Additionally, there was 
a significant positive return one day before the bad news in the B-market. Over this sample 
period, B-market investors did not anticipate the news correctly. 
For the trading volume results, the A-market did not have a significant change on the 
event day while the B-market had some significant volume reactions. The test of difference in 
volume confirms that. The trading volume increased significantly on the announcement day 
                                                 
12 For example, in 1995, the proportion of institutional investors in the SHSE A-market was 0.57% compared to 
16.47% in the B-market12 (Huang, 2004; Gao and Tse, 2004). 
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after a decrease one day before the announcement. This suggests that the B-market investors 
were more confused about their expectation of the upcoming news.  
The trading pattern in the B-market post 2002 was quite different from the pre-2001 
period. In the early period there was a large price change on small volumes while in the later 
period there was a significant increase in trading accompanied by a smaller price change. 
According to the arguments of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Bamber and Cheon (1995), 
the significant increase in trading volume in the B-market suggests that the expectations of 
investors are more diverse now than the period before 2001. The qualified institutional 
investors could trade in the domestic markets while the domestic investors could invest in the 
B-shares during this period, thus we believe the mixture of both local and foreign investors in 
the B-market has increased the diversity in investors’ expectations about the news.  
For positive announcements, Table 5 indicates that the abnormal return was 2% in the 
A-market and 2.4% in the B-market on the event day. The difference between returns across 
the two markets is also not significant, which is consistent with the results from the negative 
announcements that the information asymmetry across two markets has been reduced. 
Interestingly there is significant negative price adjustment in both of the markets prior to the 
good news. We suspect that the incorrect predictions of upcoming news in both markets were 
a result of some regulatory reform which initiated in late 2004. As shown in figure 1 and 2, 
from 2004 the Chinese stock market experienced a tremendous round of price decline. This 
bear market was triggered by the effort of Chinese government and the SFC (Securities and 
Futures Commission) to further reform the untradeable shares in the market. Releasing the 
untradeable shares held by states into the market increased the supply of new shares and thus 
was widely taken as negative news to investors who owned tradable shares at the time (Kwan 
2005a, 2005b; Bortolotti & Beltratti 2006). Starting from 2004 the Chinese market was 
overwhelmed by negative sentiment due to this reform which officially launched in April 
2005. Under such a gloomy and uncertain environment, it is not surprising that the investors 
had a negative outlook in general despite a positive earnings shock.  
Again there was no change in trading volume on the A-market. In the B-market 
however, there was a significant increase in trading on event day, and the trading  were 
reversed on day 1 and 2. Similar to the case for negative announcements, the B-market 
experienced significantly more trading compared to the A-market. The changes in the B-
market suggest that with a mixture of both domestic and foreign investors over this period of 
time, not only was the information asymmetry reduced as reflected by the disappearance of 
return differences, but there were more diverse opinions about the upcoming news.  
In general, the results after 2002 show that with reduced segmentation the difference in 
price adjustments across the two markets prior to 2001 became smaller and not significant 
upon the announcement days. The results support the improvement in information 
dissemination after the regulatory change in the B-market.  Interestingly, during this period of 
time, we saw significant increases in trading for both negative and positive announcements in 
the B-market contrary to the pre-2001 period. This suggests that the B-investors seemed more 
confused. It took more trading in the B-market to induce the price change. As both domestic 
and foreign investors now trade together, the interactions of both informed and uninformed 
investors may have caused the prediction and pre-disclosure information to be more diverse.  
Table 6 provides the results of the cross-sectional regression of price reactions of all 
announcements on the event day. Both the coefficient for market dummy and period dummy 
are significant at 95% confidence level which is consistent with our previous results that the 
price reactions between A- and B-market as well as across different time horizons were 
different. However, the coefficient for dummy measuring the news type is not significant, 
which suggests that the reactions to negative versus positive news are consistent.  
AABFJ  |  Volume 8, no. 1, 2014 
 
 90
6. Conclusion 
The results of our study show that the earnings announcements were informationally valuable 
to both the A- and B-market over the whole sample period. There were significant price 
reactions in both of the markets on the announcement day. However, the price reaction in the 
A-market was significantly smaller than the B-market when the two markets were segmented. 
The larger price adjustment in the B-market offers empirical support to the previous claim 
that the A-market investors had an informational advantage over B-market investors 
(Chakravarty et al. 1998; Chan et al. 2008). However, when trade restrictions across the two 
markets were reduced in 2002, the differences in price reactions declined and became 
insignificant. This suggests that the regulatory changes improved the informational 
dissemination process in the B-market.  
The trading activity of the A- and B- investors around announcements was also different 
when the two markets were segmented. To be associated with the price reaction, there were 
only increases in trading volumes in the A-market around the announcements and this result 
indicates that prior to 2001 the domestic investors appeared to have more diverse 
expectations and interpretations about the announcements compared to their B-market 
counterparts who were essential institutional investors. After 2002, when the local investors 
were allowed to trade in the B-market, the B-market started to experience significant 
increases in trading volume upon the news. The mixture of domestic and foreign investors 
after 2002 caused more diverse opinion about the upcoming news in the B-market and more 
consistent expectations about the upcoming news in the A-market compared to the pre-2001 
period.   
Our results clearly indicate that the information assimilation upon the earnings 
announcements to the local investors and foreign investors were different in the Chinese case.  
The results of this study have pointed out some interesting issues for future research. As the 
stock markets were only established in China three decades ago, the general perception is that 
the domestic investors are less educated about the functioning of the stock market and 
relatively less sophisticated than investors in other developed markets.13 However our results 
suggest that the A-market is actually more informed. Thus whether/how the different 
behavioural biases among local and foreign investors as suggested by Odean (1998, 1999) 
contribute to the information assimilation process in the market is an interesting issue which 
is a subject for future research.  
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Figure 1. Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share Index and B-share Index (01/08/1994 – 01/08/2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share Index and B-share Index 
(01/08/1994 – 01/08/2005) 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Shanghai Stock Exchange  Shenzhen Stock Exchange  
  A B T-statistics A B T-statistics 
Market Value 
Std. 
72915.03 
(1317.23) 
18904.39 
(494.52) 
7.968** 
105157.9 
(2732.96) 
34768.15 
(1324.23) 
3.3313** 
P/E ratio 
Std. 
77.9 
(110.054) 
68.34 
(251.56) 
2.346** 
125.18 
(363.02) 
98.75 
(358.59) 
0.2998 
Trading volume 
Std. 
1504.9 
(2364.42) 
748.50 
(1272.32) 
2.530** 
4550.67 
(18115.81) 
927.14 
(1729.85) 
1.2593 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample stocks.  There are 45 companies with both A and B-shares in each market. Market value is the total market value in millions 
of Chinese Yuan. P/E ratio is the average price earnings ratio. Trading volume is the average daily trading volume in terms of number of shares traded in units of 1000. The 
SHSE B-shares are denominated in US dollars. The market value has been converted to Chinese Yuan at exchange rate 1USD=7.8Yuan. The SZSE B-shares are denominated 
in Hong Kong dollars. The market value has been converted to Chinese Yuan at an exchange rate 1HKD=0.95 Yuan. The T-statistics are from a two sample t-test. Standard 
deviations are reported in italics. **indicates the significance at 5% level. 
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Table 2. Price and Volume Reactions to Negative News Pre-2001 
Window A-Market  
(observation 369) 
  B-Market  
(observation 224) 
Diff in return 
 
 
t-test 
Diff in vol 
 
            
Return t-test Vol Sign-M Sign-P Return t-test Vol Sign-M Sign-P       Z P 
-5 0.002 1.468 0.052 14.5 0.145 -0.001 -0.459 0.044 2 0.842 0.003 1.225 -0.307 0.380 
-4 -0.001 -0.429 -0.008 -2.5 0.835 -0.002 -0.862 -0.112 -9 0.256 0.001 0.500 -1.153 0.125 
-3 0.000 0.086 0.052 18.5 0.061 -0.001 -0.372 -0.104 -10 0.204 0.001 0.354 -2.168 0.015 
-2 -0.001 -0.659 0.004 1.5 0.917 -0.001 -0.629 0.027 2.5 0.789 0.001 0.228 0.254 0.340 
-1 0.002 1.701 0.075 28.5 0.004 0.002 0.849 -0.044 -4.5 0.592 0.000 0.073 -2.119 0.017 
               
0 -0.031 -22.190 -0.037 -8.5 0.405 -0.051 -19.512 0.028 1.5 0.894 0.020 6.791 0.424 0.336 
               
1 -0.003 -1.946 0.077 24.5 0.012 0.003 1.019 -0.137 -11.5 0.140 -0.005 -1.802 -2.288 0.011 
2 -0.001 -0.553 -0.169 -48.5 <.0001 0.002 0.955 0.054 8.5 0.284 -0.003 -1.103 3.305 0.001 
3 0.000 0.268 -0.017 -8.5 0.405 -0.002 -0.882 -0.007 -2.5 0.789 0.002 0.893 0.254 0.340 
4 0.000 0.173 -0.016 -1.5 0.917 0.003 1.452 -0.052 -2.5 0.789 -0.002 -1.122 -0.254 0.340 
5 0.000 -0.230 -0.048 -16.5 0.095 -0.003 -1.488 -0.156 -9.5 0.228 0.003 1.206 -0.932 0.176 
               
This table reports returns and changes in volumes around negative earnings announcements for the period 01/08/1995 to 20/02/2001. ‘Return’ is the abnormal return 
calculated using a Fama-French three factor model. The test for abnormal return and difference in returns is the t-test. ‘Vol’ is the change in volume calculated as the 
difference between the median change during the event window and the median of same variable over previous 20 days. Sign-M and Sign-P are from the nonparametric sign 
test for location. The ‘Diff in vol’ reports the Z value of a median two-sample test on volume differences and its P value. The significant values at 5%  level are in bold. 
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Table 3. Price, Volume Reaction to Positive News Pre 2001 
Window A-Market  
(observation 336) 
 
 B-Market  
(observation 186) 
  Diff in Return  
 
 
t-test 
Diff in vol  
Return t-test  Vol Sign-M Sign-P Return t-test  Vol Sign-M Sign-P  Z P 
-5 -0.001 -0.456 0.001 1 0.957 0.000 0.049 0.096 7 0.341  -0.001 -0.441 1.278 0.101 
-4 0.002 0.761 -0.019 -8 0.413 0.004 1.731 -0.140 -8 0.271  -0.002 -0.937 -0.730 0.233 
-3 0.001 0.335 0.025 7 0.478 0.002 1.049 -0.134 -13 0.067  -0.002 -0.647 -2.192 0.014 
-2 -0.003 -1.412 0.001 0 1 -0.001 -0.628 -0.106 -6 0.420  -0.002 -0.832 -0.913 0.181 
-1 0.000 -0.028 0.024 9 0.354 0.005 2.292 -0.147 -6 0.420  -0.005 -2.053 -1.096 0.137 
                
0 0.025 8.583 0.420 70 <.0001 0.035 14.994 -0.062 -4.5 0.557  -0.010 -3.691 -3.834 <.0001 
                
1 0.001 0.484 0.115 29 0.002 -0.004 -1.640 -0.074 -9 0.213  0.005 1.887 -2.739 0.003 
2 -0.002 -0.967 -0.119 -36 0.0001 0.002 0.875 -0.066 -6 0.420  -0.004 -1.670 0.913 0.181 
3 0.000 -0.062 -0.065 -24 0.010 0.000 0.155 -0.076 -6 0.420  0.000 -0.195 -0.183 0.428 
4 0.000 -0.010 -0.051 -21 0.025 -0.001 -0.575 0.046 3 0.714  0.001 0.483 0.730 0.233 
5 -0.001 -0.400 -0.088 -23 0.014 0.000 -0.048 -0.071 -8.5 0.239  -0.001 -0.384 0.307 0.380 
                
This table reports returns and changes in volumes around positive earnings announcements for the period 01/08/1995 to 20/02/2001. ‘Return’ is the abnormal return 
calculated using a Fama-French three factor model. The test for abnormal return and difference in returns is the t-test. ‘Vol’ is the median change in volume calculated as 
the difference between the median change during the event window and the median of same variable over previous 20 days. Sign-M and Sign-P are from the nonparametric 
sign test for location. The ‘Diff in vol’ reports the Z value of a median two-sample test on volume differences and its P value. The significant values at 5% level are in bold. 
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Table 4. Price, Volume Reaction to Negative News Post 2002 
Window A-Market  
(observation 240) 
 
 B-Market  
(observation 140) 
 Diff in return  
 
 
t-test 
Diff in vol  
 Return t-test Vol Sign-M Sign-P  Return t-test  Vol Sign-M Sign-P Z P 
-5 0.001 0.965 0.015 1.5 0.898 0.000 0.035 0.065 2 0.800 0.001 0.586 0.251 0.401 
-4 0.001 0.502 0.001 0.5 1.000 -0.002 -1.608 -0.071 -8 0.205 0.003 1.534 -1.022 0.153 
-3 0.001 0.780 -0.029 -5.5 0.520 -0.002 -1.073 -0.086 -6 0.353 0.002 1.325 -0.386 0.350 
-2 0.001 1.030 0.083 15.5 0.052 0.001 0.961 0.120 5 0.447 0.000 0.032 0.212 0.416 
-1 0.000 0.271 0.007 0 1.000 0.005 3.316 -0.133 -12 0.052 -0.004 -2.281 -1.699 0.045 
               
0 -0.018 -15.530 -0.030 -5 0.561 -0.019 -12.542 0.233 12 0.052 0.001 0.311 2.337 0.010 
               
1 -0.002 -1.285 0.007 2.5 0.796 0.002 0.990 -0.105 -9 0.150 -0.003 -1.584 -1.497 0.069 
2 -0.001 -1.007 -0.024 -9 0.273 0.000 -0.048 -0.012 -3 0.673 -0.001 -0.508 0.425 0.336 
3 -0.001 -0.773 0.004 1 0.949 -0.001 -0.579 -0.029 -3 0.673 0.000 -0.088 -0.425 0.336 
4 -0.001 -1.042 -0.022 -5 0.561 -0.001 -0.533 -0.119 -12 0.052 -0.001 -0.286 -1.487 0.069 
5 -0.001 -0.475 0.032 7 0.401 -0.002 -1.327 -0.068 -3 0.673 0.001 0.732 -0.637 0.262 
               
This table reports returns and changes in volumes around negative earnings announcements for the period 01/02/2003 to 01/08/2005. ‘Return’ is the abnormal return 
calculated using a Fama-French three factor model. The test for abnormal return and difference in returns is the t-test. ‘Vol’ is the median change in volume calculated as 
the difference between the median change during the event window and the median of same variable over previous 20 days. Sign-M and Sign-P are from the nonparametric 
sign test for location. The ‘Diff in vol’ reports the Z value of a median two-sample test on volume differences and its P value. The significant values at 5% significance level 
are in bold. 
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Table 5. Price, Volume Reaction to Positive News Post 2002 
Window A-Market  
(observation 203) 
 
 B-Market  
(observation 106) 
 Diff in return  
 
 
 
 
t-test 
Diff in vol   
 Return t-test Vol Sign-M Sign-P Return t-test Vol Sign-M Sign-P Z P  
-5 -0.005 -3.830 -0.036 -7.5 0.326 -0.003 -2.136 -0.181 -12 0.025 -0.002 -1.117 -1.395 0.082  
-4 -0.001 -0.363 0.043 9 0.232 -0.003 -1.968 0.040 2 0.771 0.003 1.281 0.000 0.500  
-3 -0.003 -2.384 0.054 6 0.439 -0.003 -1.767 0.071 5 0.382 0.000 0.078 0.240 0.405  
-2 -0.004 -2.675 -0.018 -2 0.833 0.000 0.061 0.119 7 0.207 -0.004 -1.651 1.676 0.047  
-1 -0.003 -2.234 -0.082 -8 0.291 -0.001 -0.541 0.029 2 0.771 -0.002 -0.827 1.197 0.116  
                
0 0.020 14.211 0.035 5 0.527 0.024 12.142 0.538 27 <.0001 -0.004 -1.627 4.071 <0.0001  
                
1 0.002 1.091 -0.058 -13 0.078 0.001 0.692 -0.260 -16 0.002 0.000 0.180 -2.395 0.008  
2 -0.001 -1.206 -0.009 -2 0.833 0.000 -0.236 -0.247 -14 0.008 -0.001 -0.631 -2.395 0.008  
3 0.001 0.938 0.008 0 1.000 0.002 1.441 -0.035 -3 0.627 -0.001 -0.274 -0.718 0.236  
4 -0.002 -1.490 0.002 0 1.000 0.002 1.125 0.095 6 0.285 -0.003 -1.804 0.958 0.169  
5 0.000 0.423 -0.031 -6 0.439 0.000 -0.149 0.025 3 0.627 0.001 0.396 0.718 0.236  
                
This table reports returns and changes in volumes around positive earnings announcements for the period 01/02/2003 to 01/08/2005. ‘Return’ is the abnormal return 
calculated using a Fama-French three factor model. The test for abnormal return and difference in returns is the t-test. ‘Vol’ is the median change in volume calculated as 
the difference between the median change during the event window and the median of same variable over previous 20 days. Sign-M and Sign-P are from the nonparametric 
sign test for location. The ‘Diff in vol’ reports the Z value of a median two-sample test on volume differences and its P value. The significant values at 95% significance level 
are in bold. 
AABFJ  |  Volume 8, no. 1, 2014 
 
 100
Table 6. Cross-section Regression of Price Reactions on announcement day 
 Constant Market Period News type 
Coefficients 
t-statistics 
0.079 
(26.639**) 
-0.012 
(-4.279**) 
-0.025 
(-8.651**) 
0.004 
(1.528) 
R-square 0.042    
Adjusted R-square 0.041    
This table present regression results for 
i m p n iAR a bD cD dD        
Where ARi is the abnormal return on the event day for announcement i, and dummy Dm takes 1 for A-market and 0 for B-market, Dp takes 1 for period before 2001 when two 
markets are completely segmented and 0 for period after 2002 when two markets are integrated, dummy Dn takes 1 for negative news and 0 for positive news. 
** indicates 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
